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MORTGAGE SUPPLY CHAIN FAILURE  
AND INNOVATION 
LISA DAVIS* 
Abstract: The standard mortgage supply chain is so costly and inefficient that 
large national banks have dramatically scaled back their provision of mortgages 
to low- and moderate-income households. Absent regulatory requirements, sub-
sidy, improvement in the way the mortgage supply chain works, or maybe all 
three, low- and moderate-income households will continue to be underserved by 
those banks with the largest share of the mortgage market. A number of factors 
contribute to this problem, including expensive marketing costs and commis-
sions, as well as the obsolete, paper-based technology for loan production. Argu-
ably, the national banking system has never excelled at providing fairly priced 
mortgages to low- and moderate-income borrowers or in low- and moderate-
income communities without external motivation, and furthermore, has still not 
dealt with a history of discrimination that underlies this lack of capacity. While 
community development organizations, local and regional banks, and credit un-
ions have developed small local capacity to address these credit gaps, we need a 
system for scaling up and integrating the ability to serve this sector of the market. 
For example, we need a method for integrating the housing counseling system 
and the risk mitigation benefits it provides into the loan origination process and 
secondary market pricing.  
 This Article envisions a new way of organizing the community development 
sector in order to expand sustainable credit to qualified low- and moderate-
income borrowers. To reduce costs, the existing housing counseling system 
would be tapped to provide outreach and marketing in place of the marketing 
structure used by mortgage brokers and banks. In this new supply chain, housing 
counseling agencies would refer loan applicants to community development fi-
nancial institutions (CDFIs) or credit unions, which would originate mortgages at 
reduced cost. To further limit costs, marketing would be shifted to a technology 
platform that would allow applicants to apply online and connect housing coun-
seling agencies to CDFIs and secondary market buyers. CDFIs would be con-
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nected to one another and able to share, standardize and manufacture not only 
loan products but also efficient systems for delivering them both to consumers 
and the secondary market. The Article closes by describing two initiatives that 
are seeking to create a national marketplace of CDFIs, linked to the housing 
counseling system, to create a wholesale conduit for home loans. 
INTRODUCTION 
According to recent Urban Institute estimates, 6.3 million more mortgage 
loans might have been made between 2009 and 2015 if underwriting standards 
prevailing in 2001, when lending was relatively safe, had been used. (Good-
man, Zhu & Bai 2016, 1). This credit contraction post-2008 disproportionately 
affected lower-income and minority households. (Goodman 2017, 235, 250). 
There are perhaps many reasons for the insufficient amount of mortgage lend-
ing to low- and moderate-income households and to communities of color, but 
one that is perhaps overlooked is that the big banks have decided not to do it 
because they don’t have a workable business model for it. (Andriotis 2016, 1; 
McCoy & Wachter 2017, 4). The decisions by big banks to refuse to lend to 
this population of homeowners is not because of regulation and not because of 
credit scores. It is because the business model of lending to low- and moder-
ate-income (LMI) borrowers and people of color does not work for the big 
banks. So if the big banks are pulling out of lending, what do we do to make 
sure that average Americans can get home mortgages? 
This in turn raises the question, why do we care about ensuring a suffi-
cient provision of LMI mortgages? The first reason is access. Residential 
mortgages are the primary way that people get access to the middle class in 
this country. Disparities in access to credit also represent a huge aspect of ine-
quality, which is the racial wealth gap. This shortage of adequate mortgage 
credit in our communities produces a disparate racial impact, both in terms of 
wealth and income, which drives inequality. Although the U.S. Supreme Court 
recently upheld the disparate impact theory in housing discrimination cases 
(Texas Department of Housing and Community Affairs v. The Inclusive 
Communities Project, Inc. 2015, 2525–26), proving disparate impact remains 
difficult. Disparate treatment of individuals is easier to establish. However, 
proving disparate impact and proving it in a way that actually drives towards a 
solution and an agreement that is going to ameliorate the problem is much 
more difficult. 
We also need to care about access to mortgage credit because everybody 
is affected. Ultimately, that includes the big banks. At some point the banking 
system will need to realize that there will not be the same base of retail cus-
tomers that the banks are used to without the wealth-building potential that 
home ownership represents. There will be fewer and fewer people who can 
afford to buy consumer goods and services on the scale they could ten years 
2017] Mortgage Supply Chain Failure and Innovation 305 
ago. For these reasons, an efficient mortgage system is critical to the economic 
future that we would all like to see. 
I. THE MORTGAGE SUPPLY CHAIN 
 The mortgage supply chain is a critical component of an efficient mort-
gage system. The supply chain refers to the operational system both for deliv-
ering mortgages to borrowers and financing those mortgages. This is not as 
much about policy as it is about the business practices and the institutions that 
allow for the provision of mortgages in the private sector.  
To illustrate the complications in the mortgage supply chain, I have bro-
ken that chain down into two parts: an origination part and a secondary market 
and servicing part. Figures 1 and 2 demonstrate that there are different actors at 
each step of the way that are not interconnected. Consider housing counseling 
agencies, which may interact with borrowers at points during the home-buying 
process. Studies have shown that counseling provided by these agencies can 
mitigate risk and thus loan losses on the back end. (See, e.g., Brown 2016, 
167–68; Quercia & Riley 2017, 328–29). Indeed, housing counseling can miti-
gate risk to such an extent that if we had a better supply chain, secondary mar-
ket buyers of those mortgages would price them more efficiently. But current-
ly, we do not have a mortgage supply chain system that actually establishes 
communication between the risk mitigation that happens on the front end 
through counseling, all the way into pricing in the secondary market. 
There are other failures along the way. Of these, the main failure is that 
the supply chain is very expensive. The cost of producing a mortgage loan is 
more than double on average what it was in 2009. (Cosgrove 2015, 8). The 
Mortgage Bankers Association reports that in first quarter 2016, it cost $7,845 
on average for non-depository mortgage lenders to manufacture a loan. (Mort-
gage Bankers Association 2016, 2). If bank origination costs are comparable to 
those of non-depository lenders, no wonder banks are not extending mortgage 
loans of $100,000 or less. In order to have a business model that works for 
low-value loans, loan manufacturing costs need to come down. Thus, we must 
come up with a way to improve the supply chain so we can manufacture low-
value loans more efficiently. If you look at mortgage loan production costs, a 
substantial amount goes for marketing and sales. (Id.). These are costs to both 
the brokers and the banks. In contrast, if the housing counseling system was at 
scale and connected to a mortgage delivery system using technology-based 
underwriting and manufacturing, it could actually be an effective outreach and 
marketing arm at a much lower cost. 
We also lack an integrated supply chain that is connected to a technology 
platform for mortgages in the way that, for example, travel companies or tax 
returns or car buying are connected. We have the tools and knowledge to create 
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such a technology platform, but are not currently doing it for the typical low- 
and moderate-income (LMI) borrower. Quicken and like platforms exist for 
borrowers that fit both the conforming mortgage box and lender overlay stand-
ards for higher credit scores for these loans. We could lower the manufacturing 
cost per loan, especially non-conforming loans, if we migrated the marketing 
of mortgages to a technology platform where customers could apply success-
fully online. Furthermore, the different disconnected actors in today’s mort-
gage supply chain are not there to actually deliver an efficient, well-priced 
high-quality low-risk mortgage to customers outside of a very small credit and 
underwriting box. Instead, those actors are there to make their fees or to pursue 
some other agenda that is not related to borrower needs.  
If the big banks are not going to provide high-quality mortgages to under-
served borrowers, who will? We have now reached a point where we can scale 
up a community lending system built on standardized products and operations, 
and housing counseling agencies. This type of system would route the mort-
gage manufacturing process through a network of community development 
financial institutions (CDFIs) or credit unions, resulting in more choices for 
people and a lower cost basis. 
Such a system would require a community lending infrastructure that was 
different in a couple of ways. Currently, the community development industry 
remains a cottage industry. It does not offer a high degree of standardization or 
transactional performance. CDFIs often have highly localized loan products, 
making it difficult both to manufacture loans at scale and to sell them into the 
secondary market. They often focus on one type of loan or borrower because 
that’s the type of subsidy or access to capital they have at the moment, to the 
detriment of serving a broader LMI market. Likewise, housing counselors are 
often more focused on social outcomes and are not driving towards a loan at 
the end of the day. These other outcomes are important, but they do not help 
people achieve homeownership at scale. 
II. THE EMERGENCE OF INTEGRATED SUPPLY CHAINS 
 New conceptions of the community development industry, however, are 
starting to emerge. National community lending networks are starting to think 
about the mortgage supply chain holistically and how it could connect across 
networks. Figure 3 shows a schematic design for the NeighborWorks Organi-
zation Shop Program, which seeks to connect housing counseling through the 
loan manufacturing process to a secondary market vehicle, and all the way 
back into evaluation. NeighborWorks has about 240 members around the coun-
try. They range from very small nonprofits to mid-sized regional nonprofits 
and many of them do some mortgage lending, although it is not their main ac-
tivity. These member organizations are not very efficient and most of them are 
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not self-sufficient through their lending operations. In addition, most of them 
operate as mortgage lending operates—paper-based and disconnected from 
capital providers. But they are making attempts to unite that system more care-
fully. 
Another emerging national community lending network is The National 
Mortgage Collaborative, which is funded by the Ford Foundation. The Nation-
al Mortgage Collaborative is based in a community development financial in-
stitution (CDFI) in Riverside, California, named Springboard. When I was at 
the Ford Foundation, I convened a group of the highest-performing single-
family mortgage CDFIs in the country and asked them the following: Can we 
solve the low- and moderate-income (LMI) credit gap problem? Can we look 
at the supply chain? Can we make it more efficient? Can we establish a tech-
nology platform? Can we connect counselors to secondary market perfor-
mance? How do we do this? The challenge was to break through the cottage 
industry mentality. 
A breakthrough came in the form of the California Road Home Program 
(the “Program”), which was a Home Affordable Refinance Program (HARP) 
initiative doing mortgage refinances and loan write-downs. The Program had 
developed a consumer-facing technology platform and a back office manufac-
turing hundreds of loans a week that were designed to keep people in their 
homes. The operation was relatively high-touch, compared with much of the 
industry, and was built with a $13 million investment from the U.S. Depart-
ment of the Treasury. When the HARP program was nearing its end, that in-
vestment was due to sunset, and the National Mortgage Collaborative at 
Springboard proposed repurposing the Program’s technology platform to serve 
a national marketplace of CDFIs to create a wholesale channel for loan origi-
nations. The technology platform would also connect housing counselors all 
the way through to secondary market buyers. This proposal got underway and 
the Program launched the technology platform that was repurposed from the 
HARP program to originate loans in September 2016. 
Figure 4 depicts Springboard’s mortgage delivery system. At the center of 
operations is the technology platform, which connects housing counseling 
agencies to CDFIs and eventually to the capital market. Figure 5 provides an 
illustration of two screenshots from the app. It looks like Quicken Rocket or 
any other interface where customers can plug in their data and get loans at the 
end of the day. It is very customer-friendly. 
In a next step, the National Mortgage Collaborative began to offer pri-
vate-label products and private-label web portals for all of their collaboration 
members. The leadership council that helped them to develop this product—
and that will continue to help develop the capital market component—includes 
some of the largest and highest-performing single-family CDFIs in the country, 
as well as organizations such as the Massachusetts Affordable Housing Alli-
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ance (MAHA). The National Federation of Community Development Credit 
Unions is working on something similar. 
Another important opportunity is an initiative by the national network of 
HUD housing counseling agencies. For years we have been trying to figure out 
how to pay HUD counselors for counseling. The banks are not going to pay for 
it. They did a little bit in the glory days but not so much and not consistently. 
Springboard and the National Mortgage Collaborative have committed to pay-
ing these housing counselors for any loans that they manufacture. Thus, in con-
trast with the banks, the National Mortgage Collaborative model provides a 
way for housing counselors to get paid consistently. The model also treats 
counseling as a throughput for an actual mortgage over time. 
Partner organizations in this housing counselor pilot project benefit in 
numerous ways. They can earn income while delivering enhanced value to 
their clients through increased product offerings and better transparency. In 
addition, they can originate mortgage loans wholesale for licensed lenders and 
CDFI partners. Other benefits include counseling agreements for groups per-
forming homebuyer education and pre-purchase counseling, additional home-
buyer education tools, enhanced collateral, and assistance in deploying local 
down payment assistance funds. One question is how to fund a startup like the 
National Mortgage Collaborative, and how to fund the operational capacity to 
deliver at the national scale? By scale, we are not talking about thirty-two 
mortgages per organization per year; we are aiming for an aggregate of tens of 
thousands of mortgages around the country in this space per year. 
CONCLUSION 
The goal of the integrated supply chain is to make a dent in the 6.3 mil-
lion person mortgage gap (Goodman, Zhu & Bai 2016, 1), not to think about it 
in little individual chunks. It offers great promise for large national banks to 
meet their Community Reinvestment Act and duty to serve obligations. They 
can either fund a functional supply chain for low- and moderate-income (LMI) 
borrowers or become integrated into directly. Some of them are starting to step 
up. But the way the integrated supply chain gets paid for is to recognize that 
this is a critical part of the banking system. One way or another, banks are re-
sponsible for the provision of these mortgages as part of their charters and as a 
part of national policy of a duty to serve. Nonprofits also have to focus on per-
formance, and performance at scale and delivering loans that allow them to be 
self-sufficient over time. This system will require an initial operating subsidy 
and upfront capital infusion, but hopefully over time it will become an inde-
pendent, self-sufficient system. 
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Figure 1. Mortgage Supply Chain Phase 1: Origination 
 
Source: Tim Duncan 
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Figure 2. Mortgage Supply Chain Phase 2: Secondary Market and Servicing 
 
Source: Tim Duncan 
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Figure 3. Schematic Design of NeighborWorks Organization Shop Program 
 
Source: NeighborWorks America 
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Figure 4. Springboard Mortgage Delivery System 
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Figure 5. Two Screenshots from Springboard App 
 
 
 
